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ABSTRACT  
Th8 contention that a monopolist exhausts a natural resource 
at a slower than socially optimal rate. is examined for two cases: 
(1) fixed operation costs; and (2) demand elasticity increasing 
with output. Under either or both of these assumptions monopoly 
extraction rates may be biased in the opposite direction towards 
excessive resource use. On balance, it is concluded, the effect 
of monopoly ownership on relative extraction rates must be determined 
er.ipirically, Furthermore we suggest that the addition of fixed costs 
into the analysis will tend to destroy the Pareto optimal properties 
of r�source extraction under competitive conditions. 
MONOPOLY AND THE RATE OF EXTRACTION 
OF EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: COMMENT 
In a recent paper appearing in this Review, Stiglitz (1976) 
demonstrates under a set of familiar conditions that a monopoly 
owned non-replenishable resource will tend to be exhausted at a 
slower rate than is socially optimal.1 This supports earlier views
on the subject by writers like Hotelling (1931) and Solow (1974), 
Stiglitz shows under the natural "first approximation" assumptions 
of constant demand elasticity and zero extraction costs, that 
monopolistic and socially optimal (competitive) extraction rates 
are identical. By assuming demand elasticity incr�asing with time 
or constant unit production costs, decreasing with time, he shows 
that competitive extraction rates exceed monopolistic rates, at 
least for an initial period of time, 
In this note we present realistic alternative extensions to 
the iso-elastic, zero cost analysis which tend to bias monopolistic 
extraction rates in the opposite direction; i.e., towards excessive 
resource use, The first modification allows for costs that do not vary 
with the extraction rate, Occurring in the form of land rents, 
2 capital costs, and maintenance fees, these quasi fixed costs , F, 
are incurred during each period of production and often constitute 
3a substantial portion of operating expenses • The second extension 
considers demand elasticities which vary with consumption instead of 
time. In particular since the marginal units of inputs utilized in 
small amounts are often more essential than the marginal units of 
inputs utilized in large quantities, demand elasticities that 
increase with the extraction rate are of interest, We show that 
1similar analysis comparing monopoly and socially optimal
extraction rates appear in Kay and Mirrlees (1975), Lewis (1976), 
Sweeny (1976), and Weinstein and Zechhauser (1975), Kamien and 
Schwartz (1976) compare relative extraction rates in a general 
equilibrium setting, 
2Fixed costs of this variety which can be avoided by stopping 
production were first recognized and categorized as "avoidable
fixed costs" by Smith (1961, pp. 257-259), 
3 
E. g. ,  see Hendry (1961)
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if demand elasticity increases with quantity, or if all costs are 
fixed then the monopolist tends to deplete the resource too soon. 
Heuristically, positive fixed costs provide an incentive to 
shorten the period during which they are incurred. Since monopoly 
returns represent only a fraction of society 1 s net utility (i.e. 
the monopolist fails to capture all of consumer surplus), while 
period costs (F) are the same, there is greater incentive for the 
monopolist to accelerate depletion and encounter fixeod costs over 
a smaller number of periods, Unfortunately, no such compelling yet
straightforward argument exists for the purpose of explaining the 
mechanics of increasing demand elasticity in accelerating monopolistic
depletion. 
It is also important to note that competitive ownership of the 
resource, generally, will not result in socially optimal production 
when fixed operation costs exist. This is because it will be optimal 
to restrict the number of mines operating at any time to reduce 
total fixed costs. For example with zero variable costs, least cost 
production requires that one mine operate at a time to minimize 
fixed costs, Yet with discounting there will always be an incentive 
for individual competitively owned mines to operate in current time 
periods, While several alternative forms of market intervention might 
limit the number of operating mines to the social optimum, in general 
the behavior of an unregulated competitive industry under conditions 
of positive fixed costs is difficult to assess and well beyond the 
scope of this short note.4 Consequently, our analysis will focus 
on socially optimal and monopolistic programs of resource extraction, 
Letting p(q) be the inverse demand function for the resource, 
Q0 be the initial resource supply, and qs(t) and qM(t) be the socially
optirnal and monopolisti� rates of extraction, the respective maximization 
4This topic· is currently being pursued by the authors in a 
subsequent manuscript. 
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T qs(t) -rt !0 
s 
[!0 p(q)dq -F) e dt
T 
!0
8 q/t)dt..::_Q0; qs(t), Ts�O
where r is the discount rate and T and T are the terminal extraction 
s M 
dates • Note that these terminal dates are choice variables, 
Performing the indicated maximitations, manipulation of the 
necessary conditions for (A) and (B) yield, respectively: 
(1) 
(2)
q (q) = 
rpfq(
)
) = - r e(q)qs p q 
� �-1qM(q) = R"(q) = -r e(q)q[l- e (q)-1)
where R(q) = p(q)q is the revenue function, which we presume is concave, 
and e(q) is the demand elasticity, We assume e > 1 to ensure positive 
monopolistic output, so that (1),(2),
5subject to the usual caveats, the social maximizer is assumed 
to maximize consumer surplus, the area beneath the demand curve. 
6rf the resource is contained in several mines or wells, least 
cost production with zero variable costs requires that one mine operate 
at a time to minimize total fixed costs. Consequently, F represents 
the fixed operating costs for one mine. 
7 and e'(q)� 0 imply 
(3) 
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8 The necessary terminal time conditions can be expressed as 
(4) 
where the function f(q) is defined by 
(5) f (q) = 10
q p(x)dx - qp(q), 
-1 - 2 Note that f"(q)=p'(q) e(q) - p  (q)e' e(q) 
. < 0 since e'(q).::_ O. 
The concavity of f together with f (O) = 0 and (4) imp:ly9 .
. 
(6) 
Changing variables of integration from t to q in the resource 
constraint equations yields 
(7) 
q (O) 
Jq s (T ) - [q/qs(q)]dq s s 
Consistency between (3), (6), and (7) requires that qM(O) .'.:.. qs (O);
i. e,, the monopoly initially extracts at a rate no slower than is
. 7Lest the point of this section be made vacuously we h
asten to 
assert that demand functions satisfying these requirements ff�
st, In 
particular if the social welfare function is U(q) = ln q + 2q ' th�
n 
dU/dq = q-1 + q-1/2"" p(q), From this one easily obtains e > 1 a
nd e > O. 
Moreover R" (q) < 0 everywhere. 
8Terminal time conditions are obtained by maximizing the L
agrange 
expression for this problem with respect to Ts and
 TM
. 
9If F=O we have TM=Ts = co and qM( co)
=qs(co).,O. This follows 
because e'(q) >O implies lim p(q)= co - q +O 
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socially optimal. Since inequality (3) is strict if e1(q) > 0, and 
inequality (6) is strict if F > O, the initial monopoly extraction 
rate will be excessive in either case. From equation (3) the time 
path qM(T) crosses qs(T)at most once, and only from above, Thus
the monopolist either extracts too fast for the entire extraction 
period before exhaustion (Figure l), or too fast initially and too 
slow thereafter (Figure 2), In both cases, the resource remaining, 
rL(t), is always less than socially optimal and depletion occurs 'M 10 too soon so that TM_:: Ts. This is clear for the case in Figure 1, and 
the fact that qM(O) > qs 
(0), qM(TM) = qs (T8) = 0 and that the paths 
qM(T) and qs(T) intersect only once establish this result for the case 
in Figure 2. 
Suw.marizing our argument, we have established the following: 
Proposition: In comparing monopolistic and socially optimal rates of 
extraction for the case of elastic demand and zero variable extraction 
costs, if either: 
(a) 
(b) 
F>O ,e'(q).::_O, or 
F.::_O, e'(q)>O 
then monopolistic exploitation of the resource will be excessive in that: 
(i) 
(ii) 
T.<T "'M- s (with strict inequality for case (a)) 
qM(t) > qs (t). initially, (for 0 < t_::TM when F > O, e
' (q)= O)
{iii) 0 < t <T s 
< 10.For F=O, we obtain the general result, OM(t)>Qs(t) as 
e'(q) �O. The analysis for e'(q)< 0 is in Lewis (1976).
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We have shown that the inclusion of either fixecl costs or demand 
elasticity increasing with quantity causes the monopoly to deplete 
the resource faster than is optimal, while the Stiglitz extensions lead 
to the opposite conclusion, The net effect of all these presumably 
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Figure 1. Non intersecting extraction paths (ex, iso-elastic demand 
and positive fixed costs). 
t 
qM(TM) = qs(Ts) "'O 
TM = Ts = "' 
Figure 2, Intersecting extraction paths (ex. zero fixed costs and 
demand
. 
elasticity increasing with quantity), 
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
The social maximizer's problem is to maximize the discounted 
present value of consumers' surplus, subject to a resource constraint 
and nonegativity constraints; i.e., 
(A) maximize 
q (t), T s s 
subject to 
T q (t) f, s 
[!O
s p (q)dq - F] 0 
T f, s 
0 qs(t)dt_.s.Q0
; 
q (t) > O, T > 0 s - s-
e 
Applying the maximum principle to the Hamiltonian 
H' :::H erts s ;,0
qs p(q) dq - F - A q , s s 
-rt dt
we obtain the following necessary relations for an interior solution: 
(1) d H1 s p(qs) - A 0 ai s 
a H' s 0 = "A - r A - TQ s s s 
(2) 
lim [ fqs p(q) dq - F - A q ] 
-rt 0 e 
t+T 0 s s s 






The problem facing the monopolist is similar, with �evenue, 
p(q)q,replacing consumer's surplus,i.e, , 
PM [R(q) - F] -rt dt e maximize 0 
qM(t)' TM 
subject to 
TM fo qM(t) _=:Qo; 
qs(t) .::_O, TM
.::_ 0 
conditions for an interior Analogous to (1)-(3) above, the �ecessary 





� - rAM ": 0 
(7) lim [R(qM) - F -
AMqM] t +TM 
Expressions (5) and (6) yield 
(8) 
Throughout we shall make the usual assumptions that p'(q)< 
0 ,
R'( ) >O R"(O) <O, and lim R(q)=O. If e(q) =- dlnq/dlnp q ' q + 0 
( ) 1 if defines demand elasticity as a function of q, then e q > 
-1 R' (q) = p(q) [1-e(q) ] > 0. 
Lemma 1: If e' (q) 
.E.hl 
p I (q) 
> 
= 0 for some q>O, < 
>�< R"(q) 
A-3 
Proof: Since R"(q) = p' (l-e-1) + pe'e-2"' (p' /p)R' + pe'e-
2
, we have 
� 
"'
 .E.' + �·2 R' p R'e 
The result now follows from our assumptions R"<O, R' > O, and p' < O. 
From (4), (8), and Lemma 1, we have established 
Lemma 2: Considering qs (q) and qM(q)_ as functions of q, we have 
qs <O, qM<O, and
(9) 
For use in the next lemma, define 
(10) f (q)."" r0
q p (x)dx - R(q) 
Observe that f(O) = 0 , 
.�: If e' (q).::_ 0 for. q > O, then
< > 0 for q > 0 
Furthermore, regardless of the sign of e'(q), q
M(TM) = qs(Ts) = O  if
F = O  
i:'roof: We first consider the case F > 0, Inspection of the problems 
qs (A) and (B) reveals that never will the benefit flows J0 p(q)dq - F 
and R(q)-F be negative. Hence if F > O, the continuity of R(q) and 
r0
qs p (q)dq imply that qM(TM) > 0 and qs (Ts) > 
0. The resource constraint 
then implies�· Tu 
<co , Now (1), (3), (5), .. (7), a n d  (10) yield
(ll) f(q (T )) = F,s s 
sines f' (q) = p(q) - R' (q). Differentiation of f (q) results in 
-1 -2 f"(q) = p' - R" = p' e  -pe'e , since we assume e' .:=:_ O, we have f"(q) <O, 
Since f is concave and f (O) " 0, 
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(12) qf' (q) <f(q) for q > 0 
For the case F = O, even if T = co the resources constraint forces s 
lim q (t) = q (T ) = O. 
t +co S S S 
Similarly, even if TM = co we have qM(TM) = 0 
and so qM(T ) f' (q (T ) ) = 0. Hence (11) holds for the case F = 0 too. M M M 
(10) and (11) imply qM(TM)R' (qM(TM)) 
= R(qM(TM)) when F=O, and hence the
concavity of R(q) yields qM(TM) = O. Because p' (q) <O, only at q = O
is f(q) not positive, so (ll) also implies that q (T ) = 0 when F = O. s s 
Proposition 1: For F = O, the following is true: 
(13) 
> 
< qs(O) as e' (q) 
;; 0 < 
for q > O 
For the case F>O and e1(q).:=:_O, we still have qM(O) >qs
(O).
Proof: Clearly, 1.n both (A) and (B)the resource constraint will be 
binding if extraction ever.occurs at all. A change of integration
variables in that constraint from t to q yields 
(14) 
By Lemma 2, we have 
(15) 
1 < 1 
-qM > -qs < 
as e' (q) ?;, 0 for q.:=:_ O 
Hence (14) and (15) imply (13).when F = O. If F>O, t
hen qM(TM)
>qs(Ts) 
by Lemma 3, and so (14) and (15) will also imply that qM(
O)>q5(
0) if 
e' (q) .:=:_O. 
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Proposit,!on 2 (Stiglitz): If F = 0 and e' (q) = 0 for q > O, then
(i) q8(t) = qM(t) for t�O, and (ii) TM = Ts = "'
Proof: (i) is immediate from Lemma 2 (qs(q) = qM(q))and Proposition 1 
(qM(O) = q8
(0)). From Proposition 1, q8(T) = qiTM) = O, and for e' = O
(4) and (8) yield ci.s (q) = qM(q) = -r.qe(q). Hence (ii), sii;ice only ·at "" can
q8 (t) = qM(t) = 0 
Proposition 3: If F > O and e' (q) = 0 for q > O, then 
(ii) 
(iii) 0 < t <T s 
If F > 0 and e' (q) ).> O, then (i) and (iii) hold, and there exists a time T, 
0-<T �TH' such that 
(ii') 
< as t > T and t <T s 
If F = 0 and e 1 (q) > 0, then (ii 1 ) and (iii) are true, and (i) becomes 
(i I ) T = T = "' M s 
Proof: For F > 0 and e' (q) = O, (9) becomes q (q) = q,_,(q), so the twos ··i 
parts qs(t) and qM(t) are either identical or one lies entirely above
the other while i.t is positi;,,.e. But by proposition (13), we have
qM(C) > q (O). · Hence qM(t) is always greater than q (t) while it iss s 
·positive. (i), (ii), and (iii) now follow because of the constraint 
equatio'ls �M 
Ts Q0= 10 qM(t) dt = 10 qs(t)
dt, 
For F > 0 and e 1 (q)> O, (13) becomes qM(O) > qs (O) and (9) becomes 
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Thus qM(t) can cross qs(t) at most once and only from above; i, e,
(ii'). Hence QM(t) <Q/t) for the initial period when qM(t) > qs(t).
If (iii) were not true, then there must be a time t < T such that 0 s 
QM ( t ) = Q ( t ) > 0 and qM ( t ) < q ( t ) , 0 s 0 0 s 0 
This implies that either the 
monopolist or the social maximizer is not optimizing, since a 
recomputation of the problems (A) and (B) with Q0 replaced by
O (t ) = Q (t ) would y i eld a contradiction to Proposition l; i.e., � 0 s 0 . 
qM(t ) > q (t ) • Hence (iii) is true, and T < T • But since o s o M - s 
qM('I:M) > q8 (Ts) by Lemma 3, (ii' ) now implies (i) TM <Ts, 
If F = 0 and e' (q) > O, the same argument shows (ii 1 ) and (iii), By




(1) and (5) conjoined imply 
lim R'(q) = ""
q+O 
lim A (t) = lim �(t) = "" 
t+T8 
s t+ TM 
S i n c e  (2) and (6) imply As(t) = '-s(O)e
rt and �(t) = �(O) 
respectively, (i' ) follows, 
Proposition 4: If F = O, then 
< Q (t) > s as e'(q) 
� 0 > for q > 0 
rte 
' Proof: The proof follows that of Proposition 2 and, hence, is omitted.
